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Abstract
Online social networking has quickly become one of
the most common activities of Internet users. As social
networks evolve, they encourage users to share more in-
formation, requiring the users, in turn, to place more trust
into social networks. Peer-to-peer (P2P) overlays pro-
vide an environment that can return ownership of infor-
mation, trust, and control to the users, away from cen-
tralized third-party social networks.
In this paper, we present a novel concept, social pro-
file overlays, which enable users to share their profile
only with trusted peers in a scalable, reliable, and private
manner. Each user’s profile consists of a unique private,
secure overlay, where members of that overlay have a
friendship with the overlay owner. Profile data is made
available without regard to the online state of the profile
owner through the use of the profile overlay’s distributed
data store. Privacy and security are enforced through the
use of a public key infrastructure (PKI), where the role
of certificate authority (CA) is handled by the overlay
owner and each member of the overlay has a CA-signed
certificate. All members of the social network join a
common public or directory overlay facilitating friend
discovery and bootstrap connections into profile over-
lays. We define interfaces and present tools that can be
used to implement this system, as well as explore some
of the challenges related to it.
1 Introduction
Online social networking has become pervasive in daily
life, though as social networks grow so does the wealth
of personal information that they store. Once informa-
tion has been released on a social network, known as a
user’s profile, the data and the user are at the mercy of
the terms dictated by the social network infrastructure,
which today is typically third-party, centrally owned. If
the social network engages in activities disagreeable to
the user, due to change of terms or opt-out programs not
well understood by users such as recent issues with Face-
book’s Beacon program [14], the options presented to the
user are limited: to leave the social network (surrender-
ing their identity and features provided by the social net-
work), to accept the disagreeable activities, or to petition
and hope that the social network changes its behavior.
As the use of social networking expands to become
the primary way in which users communicate and ex-
press their identity amongst their peers, the users become
more dependent on the policies of social network infras-
tructure owners. Recent work [3] explores the coupling
between social networks and P2P systems as a means to
return ownership to the users, noting that a social net-
work made up of social links is inherently a P2P system
with the aside that they are currently developed on top
of centralized systems. In this paper, we extend this idea
with focus on the topic of topology; that is, how to self-
organize social profiles that leverage the benefits offered
by a structured P2P overlay abstraction.
Structured P2P overlays provide a scalable, resilient,
and self-managing platform for distributed applications.
Structured overlays enable users to easily create their
own decentralized systems for the purpose of data shar-
ing, interactive activities, and other networking-enabled
activities. In recent work [22], we implemented mech-
anisms that allow users to create and manage their own
private overlays using a common public overlay to assist
in discovery and NAT traversal. This prior work focuses
on generic structured P2P private overlays; in this paper,
we expand upon this approach with in-depth discussion
on how to apply this technique to enable social network
overlay profiles.
Social networks consist of users, each has a profile,
a set of friends, and private messaging. The profile
contains user’s personal information, status updates, and
public conversations, similar to a message board. Friends
are individuals trusted sufficiently by a user to view the
user’s profile. Private messaging enables sending mes-
sages discretely between users without leaking the mes-
sage to other members. Using this model, we describe
how a public overlay can be used as a directory for find-
ing friends and joining existing profile overlays. Each
user has their own profile overlay, secured via a pub-
lic key infrastructure (PKI) to which they are the cer-
tificate authority (CA). The profile overlay stores profile
data in its distributed data store, supporting profile access
in scalable mechanisms regardless of the profile owner’s
online status. In this paper, we present the architecture of
these overlays, as presented in Figure 1, and how they are
used to find and befriend peers, and describe approaches
to handling profile data and establishing initial connec-
tions to profile overlays.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion 2 provides background and related work. Section 3
describes our multi-overlay approach, explaining how to
map social networks onto structured P2P overlays. In
Section 4, we explore some of the remaining challenges
introduced by our approach. We conclude the paper in
Section 5.
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Figure 1: An example social overlay network. Alice has a
friendship with Bob and Carol, hence both are members of her
profile overlay. Bob has a friendship with Alice and Dave but
not Carol; hence Alice and Dave are members of his profile
overlay, while Carol is not. Each peer has many overlay mem-
berships but a single root represented by dashed lines in various
shades of gray. For clarity, overlay shortcut connections are not
shown.
2 Background
In this section, we review structured P2P overlays
and distributed, decentralized online social network ap-
proaches.
2.1 Structured P2P Overlays
Structured P2P systems provide distributed look-up
services with guaranteed search time with a lower bound
of O(logN), in contrast to unstructured systems, which
rely on global knowledge/broadcasts, or stochastic tech-
niques such as random walks [6]. Some examples of
structured systems can be found in [18, 20, 12, 13, 16,
10]. In general, structured systems are able to make these
guarantees by self-organizing a structured topology, such
as a 2D ring or a hypercube.
In the overlay, each node is given a unique node ID
drawn from a large address space. Each node ID must
be unique otherwise address collisions will occur, which
can prevent nodes from participating in the overlay. Fur-
thermore, having the node IDs well distributed assists in
providing better scalability as many shortcut selection
algorithms depend on having node IDs uniformly dis-
tributed across the entire address space. Two approaches
to ensure this behavior are to have each node use a cryp-
tographically strong random number generator to gener-
ate the node ID, or to use a trusted third party generate
node IDs and cryptographically sign them [7].
Overlay shortcuts enable efficient routing in ring-
structured P2P systems. Different shortcut selection
methods include: maintaining large tables without us-
ing connections and only verifying usability when rout-
ing messages [18, 13], maintaining a connection with a
peer every set distance in the P2P address space [20], or
using locations drawn from a harmonic distribution in the
node address space [12].
Most structured P2P overlays support decentralized
storage/look-up of information by mapping keys to spe-
cific node IDs in an overlay. At a minimum, the data is
stored at the node ID either smaller or larger to the data’s
node ID and for fault tolerance the data can be stored at
other nodes. This sort of mapping and data storage is
called a distributed hash table (DHT). DHTs provide the
building blocks to form more complex distributed data
stores as presented in Past [17] and Kosha [5].
In [8, 15], the authors discuss the concept of a single
overlay supporting services through the use of additional
overlays, which use the underlying overlay to assist in
discovery. In [22], we presented a reference implemen-
tation of a multiple-overlay system that supports the use
of a public overlay’s DHT to store currently active peers
in the private overlays. The system allows users to cre-
ate their own private overlays without having to create
their own bootstrap network. During evaluation, using
both simulated and real systems, the time for a single
peer to join first the public and thereafter private overlays
was small and grew logarithmically with network sizes.
The real system was tested using a public overlay of 600
nodes on PlanetLab and a random distribution of peers
in the private overlay. With point-to-point security links
enabled in the private overlay, the time to connect was
less than 22 seconds for all cases. In simulations, over-
lays with as many as 100,000 peers were evaluated. For
the 100,000-peer overlay, regardless of the private over-
lay size and with security enabled, peers were able to
connect to their private overlays in less than 48 seconds.
In relation to this paper, these results can be interpreted
such that the latency required for a single peer to from
being completely disconnected from the social network
to being fully connected to the directory and all profile
overlays.
In addition, our system provides both relay-based and
hole-punching NAT traversal [21] techniques and sup-
ports point-to-point PKI based security [22], forming a
basis for the approach presented in this paper.
2.2 Peer-to-Peer Social Networks
In [4], a DHT provides the look-up service for storing
meta data pertaining to a peer’s profile. Peers query the
DHT for updated content from their friends by hashing
their unique identifiers (e.g. friends’ email addresses).
The retrieved meta data contains information for obtain-
ing the profile data such as IP address and file version.
Their work relies on a PKI system that provides iden-
tification, encryption, and access control. In contrast,
our approach provides each user their own private over-
lay secured by point-to-point encryption and authentica-
tion amongst all peers in the profile overlay. The profile
overlay provides a clean abstraction of access control,
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whereby once admitted to a private overlay, users can ac-
cess a distributed data store which holds the contents of
the owners profile.
[19] takes a different approach by depending on virtual
individual servers (VIS) hosted on a cloud infrastruc-
ture such as Amazon EC2. Friends contact each other’s
VIS directly for updates. A DHT is used as a directory
for groups and interest-based searches. Their approach
assumes bidirectional end-to-end connectivity between
each VIS, where a profile is only available during the
up time of the VIS. Because of the demands on network
connectivity and up time, the approach assumes a cloud-
hosted VIS and has difficulty being used on user-owned
resources. Our approach enables users to avoid the need
for all-to-all connectivity and constant up time through
the use of NAT traversal support and the ability to store
the profile in the overlay’s distributed data store.
The approach presented in [9] also uses a DHT for
looking up a peer’s circle of friends. Once a node in
the peer’s outermost circle is found, that node is used to
route profile requests to the innermost circle which con-
tains replicas of a peer’s profile. Trust is enabled through
the use of an identification service contacted through the
DHT. The circle of friends concept lacks the simplicity
of the abstraction made in our approach, which can easily
be applied to existing structured overlays unlike the con-
cept of innermost and outermost circles. Our approach
also enables the profile owner to serve as a CA, ensuring
that nodes can only access a profile overlay after having
obtained a signed certificate.
Unlike the above approaches, the P2P social network
presented in [1] uses an unstructured overlay without a
DHT where peers connect directly to each other rather
than through the overlay establishing unique identifiers
to deal with dynamic IPs. Peers cache each other’s data
to improve availability. While helper nodes are used to
assist with communication between peers behind NATs.
The approach lacks security and access control consider-
ations and lacks the guarantees and the simplicity of the
abstraction offered by a structured overlay.
3 Social Overlays
In this section, we explain how to map online social net-
working to our multi-overlay social network consisting
of a public directory overlay with many private profile
overlays. The directory overlay supports friend discov-
ery and verification and stores a lists of peers currently
active in each profile overlay. Profile overlays support
message boards, private messages, and media sharing.
3.1 Finding and Verifying Friends
In a traditional social network, a directory provides the
ability to search for users using public information, such
as the user’s full name, user ID, e-mail address, group
affiliations, and friends. The search results return zero or
more matching directory entries. Based upon the results,
the user, A, can potentially make a friendship request.
The request receiver, B, can review the public informa-
tion of A to making a decision. If B accepts the request,
A and B are given access to each other’s profiles. Once
profile access has been enabled, the users can learn more
information, and if it turns out to be a mistake, the peers
can unilaterally end the relationship.
To map this to our proposed social overlay, the direc-
tory entries would be inserted into the DHT of a public
overlay. As discussed in previous work, the DHT keys
for these entries should consist of a subset of the user’s
public information in lower-case format and hashed to
an overlay address. The value stored at these keys is
the user’s certificate, which consists of its public infor-
mation and an overlay address where the user expects to
receive notifications. This overlay address can be used
for asynchronous offline messaging, whose function we
will explain shortly.
Because the users need a way to verify each other that
involves social credentials, we propose the use of a new
form of certificate. The main portion of the certificate is
similar to a self-signed x509 certificate with public infor-
mation such as user’s name, e-mail address, and group
affiliations embedded into the certificate. At the tail of
the certificate is a friend list represented by many friend
entries. To do this we propose employing a technique
similar to PGP: users can acquire from their friends a
signed message consisting of a hash of the peer’s cer-
tificate, the time stamp, and the friend’s certificate hash
signed by the friend. Since PGP does not provide a
strong method for revocation, the time stamp provides
additional information to help decide whether or not a
friendship link is still active without accessing the pro-
file overlay of either peers. Peers should request a new
friend list entry within a certain period of time or it will
appear that the friendship is no longer valid.
While looking for an individual, a peer may discover
that many individuals have overlapping public informa-
tion components, such as the user’s name. Assuming
all entries are legitimate, the overlay must have some
method of supporting multiple, distinct values at the
same key, leaving the peer or the peer’s DHT client to
parse the responses and determining the best match by
reviewing the contents of each certificate. Alternatively,
a technique like Sword [2], which supports distributing
the data across a set of nodes and using a bounded broad-
cast to discover peers that match all information, could
be used for searching.
If a peer, A, desires a friendship with another peer, B,
A issues a friendship request, which will be stored in
the DHT at the overlay address listed in B’s certificate,
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as described earlier. The friendship request consists of
the self-signed certificate of A, the requesting peer; the
public information of the request receiver, B; and a time
stamp; all signed with the private key associated with A’s
private key matched to their self-signed certificate.
Within a reasonable amount of time after a request has
been inserted into the DHT, B can come online and check
for outstanding requests. Upon receiving a request, B
has three choices: a conditional accept, an unconditional
accept, or a reject. During an unconditional accept, B
signs A’s request and issues a request to befriend A. Al-
ternatively in the case of a conditional accept, B issues a
friendship request, waits for a reply, and investigates the
profile prior to signing the A’s request. Once a user has
received a signed certificate, they may access the remote
peer’s profile overlay as discussed in 3.2, which is also
responsible for activities such as revocation.
3.2 The Profile Overlay
In a traditional social network, the profile or user-
centric portion consists of private messaging, data shar-
ing, friendship maintenance, and a public message board
for status updates or public messages. In this section, we
explain how these components can be applied to a struc-
tured overlay dedicated to an individual profile.
Using the techniques such as those described in [22],
it is feasible to efficiently multiplex a P2P system across
multiple, virtual private overlays enabling each profile
owner to have a profile overlay consisting of their on-
line friends. For access control, we employ a PKI, where
each member uses the signed certificate generated dur-
ing the “finding and verifying friends” stage. All links
are encrypted using symmetric security algorithms estab-
lished through the PKI, thus preventing uninvited guests
from gaining direct access to the overlay and hence the
profile. Because the profile owner also is the CA for
all members of the overlay, they can easily revoke users
from access to the profile overlay. In [22], we described
mechanisms for overlay revocation through the use of
broadcasting for immediate revocation and the use of
DHT for indirect and permanent revocation.
The message board of a profile can be stored in two
ways: distributed within the profile overlay via a data
store or stored on the profile owner’s personal comput-
ing devices. The distributed data store provide the profile
when the owner is offline and also distributes the load for
popular profiles. For higher availability, each peer should
always be a provider for all data in their profile when they
are online. To ensure authenticity and integrity, all peers
should sign their messages and each peer’s certificate
should be available in the overlay for verification. Mes-
sages that are unsigned should be ignored by all mem-
bers of the overlay. An ideal overlay for this purpose
should support complex queries [11] allowing easy ac-
cess to data stored chronologically, by content, by type,
i.e., media, status updates, or message board discussions.
Private messaging in the profile overlay is unidirec-
tional meaning that only the profile owner can receive
private messages using their overlay. To enforce this,
a private message should be prepended with a symmet-
ric key encrypted by the profile owners public key, the
message should be appended by a hash of the message
to ensure integrity and the entire message encrypted by
the symmetric key. This approach ensures that only the
sender and the profile owner can decrypt the private mes-
sage. The contents of the private message should include
the sender, time sent, and the subject. Messages can be
stored in well known locations, so that the profile owner
can either poll the location or, alternatively, use an event
based system to notify them of the new message.
3.3 Active Peers
The directory overlay should be used to assist in find-
ing currently active peers in the profile overlays. By plac-
ing their node IDs at a well-known, unique per-profile
overlay keys in the DHT, active peers can bootstrap in-
coming peers into the profile overlay. We implemented
and evaluated this concept in [22]. Because the profile
overlay members all use PKI to ensure membership, even
if malicious peers insert their ID into the active list, it
would be useless as the peer would only form connec-
tions with peers who also have a signed certificate.
4 Challenges
While structured P2P overlays have been well-studied in
a variety of applications, their use in social profile over-
lays raises new interesting questions, including:
1) Handling small overlay networks - P2P over-
lay research typically focuses on networks larger than
the typical user’s friend count (Facebook’s average is
1301). Because social profile overlays are comparatively
smaller, this can impact the reliability of the overlay and
availability of profile data. A user can host their own pro-
file; however when the user is disconnected it is impor-
tant that their profile remains available even under churn.
It is thus important to characterize churn in this applica-
tion to understand how to best approach this problem. An
optional of per-user deployment of a virtual individual
server (VIS) and the use of replication schemes aware of
a user’s resources provide possible directions to address
this issue.
2) Overlay support for low bandwidth, uncon-
nected devices - devices such as smart phones cannot
constantly be actively connected to the overlay and the
connection time necessary to retrieve something like a
phone number may be too much to make this approach
1http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics
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useful. Similar to the previous challenge, this approach
could benefit from using a VIS enabling users access to
their social overlays by proxy without establishing a di-
rect connection to the overlay network.
3) Reliability of the directory and profile overlay -
Overlays are susceptible to attacks that can nullify their
usefulness. While the profile overlay does have point-to-
point security, in the public, directory overlay, the lack
of any form centralization makes policing the system a
complicated procedure. While our approach of append-
ing friends list can assist users in making decisions on
identity, it does not protect against denial of service at-
tacks. For example, users could attempt create many sim-
ilar identities in an attempt to overwhelm a user in their
attempt to find a specific peer. Previous work has pro-
posed methods to ensure the usability of overlays even
while under attack. For the social overlay to be success-
ful, we must identify which methods should be used.
A possible approach is to replicate public information
within a user’s profile overlay thus providing an alter-
native directory overlay for querying prior to using the
public directory overlay.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed methods by which a social
network can be decentralized through the use of struc-
ture P2P overlays. Our approach uses multiple overlays
where all users join a public directory overlay and a sub-
set of the individual profile overlays. The directory over-
lay enables users to find and befriend other peers and
bootstrap connections into the secure profile overlays.
Upon forming a friendship through the directory overlay,
peers are given CA signed certificates that allow them to
join each other’s profile overlay. The owner of the pro-
file overlay acts as CA enabling unilateral dismissal of
friendships via certificate revocation using efficient and
reliable methods. For the purpose of storing profile in-
formation into the overlay, we cite previous work that
can be used to provide distributed data services and give
examples of how to store data securely in the overlay.
Our proposed system returns control of the social net-
work and more importantly users’ identity to the users
and eliminates the need for centralized social networks.
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